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Abstract—In general, DRM (Digital Rights Management) 
system is responsible for the safe distribution of digital content, 
however, DRM system is achieved with individual function 
modules of cryptography, watermarking and so on. In this 
typical system flow, it has a problem that all original digital 
contents are temporarily disclosed with perfect condition via 
decryption process. In this paper, we propose the combination of 
the differential codes and fragile fingerprinting (DCFF) method 
based on incomplete cryptography that holds promise for a 
better compromise between practicality and security for 
emerging digital rights management applications. Experimental 
results with simulation confirmed that DCFF keeps compatibility 
with standard JPEG codec, and revealed that the proposed 
method is suitable for DRM in the network distribution system.  
Keywords—DRM (Digital Rights Management), Incomplete 
Cryptography, Differential Codes, Fragile Fingerprinting 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Recent technological advances in the area of multimedia 
content distribution have resulted in a major reorganization of 
this trade. Valuable digital artworks can be reproduced and 
distributed arbitrarily without any control by the copyright 
holders. Digital content has these advantages but has 
shortcoming such as piracy of copyright, an illegal copy and 
editing. Thus, issues related to intellectual property rights 
protection and management arise. 
DRM system can prevent from thus piracy of the contents 
as cutting the user off from an illegal approach to the content 
through the encryption of it [1, 2]. However, conventional 
DRM technologies are manipulated by encryption and 
watermark method separately. Therefore, original content is 
disclosed temporarily inside user's system in the user's 
decryption process (key management process) [3]. In that case, 
the original content is able to be distributed without any 
fingerprinting information. And producer also can't trace the 
illegal distributor. 
To ensure that digital content is used for its intended 
purpose after it has been delivered to customers often requires 
the ability to track and identify entities involved in 
unauthorized redistribution of multimedia content. Digital 
fingerprinting is a technology for enforcing digital rights 
policies whereby unique labels, known as digital fingerprints, 
are inserted into content prior to distribution. For multimedia 
content, fingerprints can be embedded using conventional 
watermarking techniques to an individual. 
If fingerprinting system is unifiedly integrated with DRM 
system, however, it is possible to trace the illegal traitor and 
protect the content having the copyright. Fingerprinting system 
plays the role of the insertion of user information into the 
content which is similar to the watermarking technology [4, 5, 
6]. 
In this paper, we describe an integration and 
implementation of DRM technique using DCFF based on an 
incomplete cryptography system. The know-how of the 
proposed method is the fundamental incomplete cryptography. 
Using incomplete cryptography, the producer will encode a 
part of original contents to make scrambled contents (trial 
contents) for distributing widely to users via network. On the 
other hand, in the receivers/users side, the quality of scrambled 
contents can be controlled with the fingerprinted key at the 
incomplete decoding process for embedding individual user 
information into the incomplete decoded contents 
simultaneously. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces 
some reviews of related works for DRM applications. The 
proposed incomplete cryptography is presented in Section 3. 
Section 4 explains the detail of algorithm for DCFF and 
implementation to DRM system. The application of DCFF in 
JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group) algorithm and those 
experimental results are described in Section 5. The conclusion 
is summarized in Section 6. 
II. REVIEW OF RELATED WORKS 
Our research has been inspired by a number of 
conventional works available in the literature that employ 
digital watermarking for copyright protection of digital content. 
We focus on the dual targets of digital content: legal access and 
                           The International Journal of Soft Computing and Software Engineering [JSCSE], Vol. 3, No. 3, Special Issue: 
The Proceeding of International Conference on Soft Computing and Software Engineering 2013 [SCSE’13], 
San Francisco State University, CA, U.S.A., March 2013 
Doi: 10.7321/jscse.v3.n3.77         e-ISSN: 2251-7545 
 
508 
 
traitor tracing. Many papers have been written about the 
techniques that use both encryption and fingerprinting in the 
literature. The existing integration of encryption and 
fingerprinting technology, divided into three categories, is 
briefly described as follows. 
Server-side encryption and fingerprint embedding: A 
original content is separately embedded with an user's 
fingerprint and then encrypted with a global key to create an  
 
Fig. 1. Overview basic idea of incomplete cryptography. 
encoded content. However, there are some disadvantages in 
this model: The first one is inefficient bandwidth utilization 
because digital fingerprint embedding is done at the server, 
then it will be high computation cost if user repeats request of 
same content many times. The second one is insecure because 
only a single global encryption key is used. If a malicious user 
can decode another user's data, then original content can be 
obtained and be illegally distributed. 
Server-side encryption and user-side fingerprint embedding 
(conventional DRM system): Macq et al. [8] proposed the 
fingerprint embedding at the users side for digital TV. After 
that, Hartung et al. [9] and Bloom et al. [10] extended the idea 
of [8] for applying to DRM in digital cinema. In this model, 
only one global key encryption is employed to encode the 
digital content at the server side. Next, the encoded content can 
be sent to different users via network for multicasting. At the 
user side, the encoded content can be decrypted according to 
the global key and it must to be fingerprinted based on user's 
information. Meanwhile, the digital fingerprint must be 
embedded into the content after decoding to generate the 
fingerprinted content for each user. In general, a watermarked 
software (DRM controller software) is necessary in this 
scenario for embedding the fingerprinting information into 
content after decoding the encrypted content. However, the 
watermarked software is still an open problem because the 
original content is possibly revealed inside the system by this 
software. 
Joint fingerprinting and decryption (JFD): Kundur et al. [7] 
proposed a JFD method to reduce system complexity and 
achieve the real-time requirement. In JFD method, the encoded 
content is partially decrypted such that the un-decrypted parts 
imitate multimedia fingerprint embedding. JFD is conceptually 
promising, achieving partial multimedia decryption and 
multimedia fingerprint embedding at the same time. However, 
the un-decrypted parts should not affect the whole transparency 
of the fingerprinted content and it should be robust against 
some attacks. 
In next section, we present a new incomplete cryptography 
method, which can be incorporated into the DRM system. Most 
importantly, our method does not encounter the same problems 
as the above three types of methods. 
III. PROPOSAL OF INCOMPLETE CRYPTOGRAPHY 
The proposed incomplete cryptography for DRM systems is 
explained in this section. There are two steps in the proposed 
cryptography: the incomplete encoding and the incomplete 
decoding. The basic idea of the incomplete cryptography is 
shown in Fig. 1. 
A. Incomplete encoding 
The incomplete encoding process is presented in this sub-
section. Producer T has a digital content P and needs to create 
an encoded content by incomplete cryptography. In that case, P 
will be encoded based on the encoder function E with the 
encoder key k to make the scrambled content C. 
C = E(k, P)     (1) 
In the incomplete cryptography, C can be simply 
recognized a part of P (even if C is not decoded). This feature 
is called incomplete confidentiality. T can distribute C widely 
to users as trial content via network. 
B. Incomplete decoding 
The incomplete decoding process is different from the 
complete decoding process. Decoded content is created by 
another decryption function D' with another decoded key k'i (i 
= 1,2,...,n). Note that, D' with k'i is different from D with k. 
Decoded content P'i is calculated as follows: 
P’i = D’(k’i, C)    (2) 
In this case, because P'i is decoded by another decryption 
function D' with key k’i, it will be different from original 
content P. Therefore, the relationship of P and P'i is P'i
 
≠P in 
incomplete cryptography system. Hence, this decoder process 
is quite different from the complete cryptography. This feature 
is called incomplete decode. 
According to the features of incomplete cryptography, if a 
set of decoder key k'i with decoder function D' to decode the 
scrambled content C are chosen, a set of decoder content P'i 
will be created and different from each other. So, if the 
incomplete cryptography is implemented to construct a 
distribution system via network, the producer can distinguish 
the legal user by P'i that is decoded based on key k'i. 
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C. New DRM system using Incomplete Cryptography 
Since the the incomplete cryptography has the incomplete 
confidentiality and the incomplete decode feature, it makes no 
value to a secret transmission system. However, the incomplete 
cryptography is able to manipulate the contents via an 
information transmission system so far as the distortion level 
permits. Especially, if the features of the incomplete 
cryptography are implemented to a DRM system, the 
incomplete encoding (make scrambled content) and the 
incomplete decoding (make fingerprinted content) processes 
are required to resolve the above mentioned problem.  
 
TABLE I.  COMPARISON OF EXIST METHODS. 
 
The idea of new DRM system based on incomplete 
cryptography is presented in this subsection [11, 12]. A DRM 
system requires to enable the distribution of original contents 
safely and smoothly, as well as to enable the secondary use of 
contents under rightful consents. When a DRM system is 
constructed using the incomplete cryptography to implement a 
content distribution system, it is not only the safety distribution 
method to users, but also the solution of the conventional DRM 
problem (disclose the original content inside user's system). 
Before distribution, T has a digital content P and needs to 
be sent to users as much as possible. Thus, T creates a 
scrambled content C with the encryption key k based on the 
incomplete encoding. C is to disclose a part of P. It means that 
C is maintained over the minimum quality of P. T distributes C 
to users widely via network as a trial content. 
After trial C which is distributed via network, R decides to 
purchase a digital content. Then, R has to register his/her 
individual information (user ID). This information will be used 
as the fingerprinting information (wm) and embedded into the 
content. When T receives the purchaser's agreement, T sends a 
fingerprinted key k'i to R. k'i is the incomplete decoding key 
and it is prepared individually to each user. 
R decodes C using k'i and obtains the high quality content 
P'i. In this decoding process, ID information (wm) of user will 
be embedded in P'i as the copyright information. 
Therefore, when a producer wishes to check whether the 
user is a legal user, he/she can extract the fingerprinting 
information from P'i and compare with his user database. If the 
fingerprinting information matches his database, the user is a 
legal user. Conversely, if the fingerprinting information is a 
different from his database, the user is an illegal user. 
Furthermore, it can specify to trace the source of pirated copies. 
The purpose of this proposed method is to inform the users 
about the existence of fingerprinting which can exactly identify 
users, and limit the illegal redistribution in advance. 
Note that, in this study, robustness is not the major concern. 
Therefore, we derive analytic bounds of the embedded signals 
to achieve the highest transparency and ensure that our 
technique can trace the traitor exactly. 
D. Comparison of our method and conventional method 
There are three primary technologies currently used to 
identify content in the new unstructured distribution: digital 
watermarking, digital fingerprinting and JFD. While three 
enable content identification, they differ in some significant 
ways that bear on their appropriateness for different 
applications. Our proposed method differs from those 
techniques. Table I shows the brief comparison of 
conventional methods with our proposed method. 
We compare our method with conventional methods on a 
number of criteria to provide a better understanding of the 
advantages of proposed approach. 
 Embedding information: is defined here as the 
information is embedded into digital content after 
distribution to users. Watermarking is generally using 
copyrights information for embedding. Watermarking is 
not intended to identify the user. The presence of the 
watermark is to prove that the content is a copy.  
Fingerprinting is generated by content-based processing 
such as fingerprint of human. Normally, the hash value 
of digital content is used to distinguish the contents. In 
JFD method, the un-decrypted parts imitate multimedia 
fingerprint embedding in the decoding process. On the 
other hand, in our method, the user ID is used to embed 
into decoded content for individual user when user 
decodes the trial content. 
 Trial content, is the low quality contents, which are 
distributed to users widely via network. In conventional 
watermarking and fingerprinting method, there is not 
the concept of the trial content. The copyrights 
information is directly embedded into the content before 
delivering to the user. Otherwise, our method and JFD 
method employ the trial content for advertisement of 
content. Then, users can try the content beforehand to 
decide whether purchase or not. 
 Cost, is considered the objective costs like computer 
resources and more subjective factors such as system 
complexity. In watermarking and fingerprinting method, 
since embedding information is directly embedded into 
the original content before distributing, server-side is 
almost responsible for embedding by high computation 
cost. If watermarking and fingerprinting is used for 
distinguishing the legal users, the user-based 
information should be embedded into content before 
distribution. Therefore, the cost computation of these 
methods are not good. On the other hand, our method 
and JFD shift the decoding process to user-side, then 
high computation cost in server-side is clearly reduced. 
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 Illegal user identification, is the measure method to 
detect whether the users is an illegal user. In 
watermarking method, if producer can detect the 
watermarking information from redistributed content, 
the user who possessed that content will be judged as 
the illegal user. In fingerprinting and JFD method, 
when detected fingerprint doesn't match against a 
reference database or un-decrypted parts doesn't match 
against database, the content possessor will be judged as 
illegal user. Otherwise, in our proposed method, we 
define that when user ID is not detected or doesn't 
match against database, then user is judged as illegal 
user. Therefore, all attacks that try to remove or 
replace the user ID from an embedded content will 
be disabled. And the content, which is generated by 
those attacks will be considered as illegal content. 
 Traceability, is the ability of system for detection the 
source of pirated content. Watermarking method is 
generally used for copyrights protection, then 
watermark information is not particular user 
information. So, watermarking cannot trace the source 
of pirated content. JFD method is considered that it can 
trace the source of pirated content by detection the un-
decrypted parts of individual user in decoded content, 
but it seems quite complicated. Unlike watermarking 
and JFD method, user ID is employed for information 
embedding in our proposed method and fingerprinting. 
So that, if we detect the user ID from decoded content, 
we can trace exactly the illegal source of pirated content. 
IV. ALGORITHM OF DCFF 
To demonstrate the practical compromises necessary for 
new DRM design, we propose a straightforward DCFF 
algorithm. In addition, we introduce the hash value [13] of the 
incomplete decoded content to distinguish the users. There are 
two basic processes in the incomplete cryptography with 
respect to digital content as shown in Fig. 2 (a) and (b). 
A. Scrambled method using differential codes 
In this scrambled method, the incomplete encoding is 
utilized to obtain the scrambled content (trial contents) that is 
delivered to users via network. The scrambled content has an 
important role in user's decision of purchase. Suppose P is a 
content in the original contents domain, k = {kξC,  k
ψ
C } is an 
encoder key. C is archived by degrading the quality of P (see 
Fig. 2 (a)). The encoding process is summarized as follows. 
Step 1. Obtain n significant coefficients from P, which are 
shown as: 
P = {p0,p1,…,pn}    (3) 
Step 2. To scramble the nth coefficient of P, a value of kξC 
is randomly generated by T. 
Step 3. The element pn is encrypted by k
ξ
C with the 
operator ⊙ to obtain the encoded coefficient is termed as 
scrambled coefficient en. 
en = pn ⊙ kξC     (4) 
Reader should note that we require (n - 1) operators ⊙ that 
are randomly generated by key kψC ={-1,1}. Operator ⊙ is 
selected the subtraction (-) if kψC =-1 or the addition (+) if k
ψ
C 
=1. 
Step 4. Excepting the coefficient pn, another coefficients pi 
(0 ≤ i < n) are encrypted to obtain another encrypted coefficient 
ei based on using pi with the previous difference ei+1 and it is 
following: 
ei = pi ⊙ ei+1, i = 0,1,2,…,n-1   (5) 
According to this algorithm, the significant coefficients in P 
are encoded with an encoder key k = {kξC,  k
ψ
C} based on the 
differential codes algorithm and the scrambled content C is 
obtained. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Overview of DCFF algorithm. 
B. Fragile fingerprinted method 
The fingerprinted method is utilized at the user Ri side. 
Suppose Ri receives the decoder key ki = {k
ξ
i,  k
ψ
i} from T. The 
fingerprinted content is created by Ri using the incomplete 
decoding process (Fig. 2(b)). This algorithm is following. 
Step 1. Obtain n significant coefficients from scrambled 
content C, 
C = {e0, e1,…, en}    (6) 
Step 2. A user Ri’s information based decoder key k
ξ
i that is 
created by T, is delivered to Ri. 
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Step 3. Then an element en is decrypted by k
ξ
i and the 
operator ⊙ to get the decoded coefficient is termed as 
fingerprinted coefficient dn. 
dn = en ⊙ kξi     (7) 
Step 4.  Excepting the coefficient en, another coefficients ei 
(0 ≤ i < n) are decrypted to obtain the another decrypted 
element di from bellow formula: 
di = ei ⊙ ei+1, i = 0,1,2,…,n-1   (8) 
Here, we also require (n – 1) operators ⊙ that are randomly 
generated by key kψi = {-1,1}. Operator ⊙ is also selected the 
subtraction (-) if kψi =-1 or the addition (+) if k
ψ
i =+1. Note that, 
because of kψi 
 
≠kψC, operators ⊙ patterns that are implemented 
in the decoding process is difference from patterns using in the 
encoding process and then it is clear that di ≠pi. 
Therefore, according to combination of {k, ki}, we can 
implement the incomplete cryptography and then control the 
quality content P'i to user Ri based on his/her individual 
information. 
C. Tracing the source of pirated copies 
When a producer wishes to check whether the user is a 
legal user, he/she can extract the hashing information H'i from 
P'i and compare with the hashing information Hi that is 
extracted from Pi. Pi is the decrypted content by T using the 
same decode key {k, ki}. If the hashing information matches 
his hashing value, the user is a legal user. Conversely, if the 
hashing information is different from his hashing value, the 
user is an illegal user. Furthermore, it can specify to trace the 
source of pirated copies. The purpose of this proposed method 
is to inform the users about the existence of individual hashing 
information which can exactly identify users, and limit the 
illegal redistribution in advance.  
V. APPLICATION DCFF ON JPEG ALGORITHM 
A. Experimental environment and image 
All experiments were performed by incomplete encoding 
and incomplete decoding on JPEG [15] images using the Vine 
Linux 3.2 system. In order to generate the encryption key and 
decryption key {k, ki}, we used function rand() of GCC version 
3.3.2 (http://gcc.gnu.org/) with seed=1. Additionally, the 
ImageMagick version 6.6.3-0 
(http://www.imagemagick.org/script/) was used to convert and 
view the experimental JPEG images. 
We prepared some different features of experimental 
images regarding CG, scenery, construction and person. Ten 
test images are the 8-bit RGB images of SIDBA (Standard 
Image Data BAse) international standard image (Lighthouse, 
Pepper, Title, Lenna, Girl, Airplane, Parrots, Couple, Milkdrop, 
Mandrill) of size 256×256 pixels. 
Here, all images were compressed with quality 75 (the 
lowest 0⇔100 the highest) to make experimental JPEG images 
for evaluation of the proposal method. 
B. Evaluation of image quality 
We used PSNR (Peak Signal to Noise Ratio) [14] to 
evaluate the JPEG image quality. In these experiments, the 
PSNR were calculated with RGB pixel data of original image 
and the JPEG image. A typical value for PSNR in a JPEG 
image (quality 75) is about 30dB and the suitable PSNR of trial 
image is around 20dB [11]. 
C. Scrambled content 
To make scrambled and incomplete decoding contents of 
JPEG, and we have selected the quantized DCT tables to 
implement the incomplete cryptography. In order to simply 
implement the demonstrated method, we assume that the 
operators of the encoded key kψi are all negative (subtraction: -
), and the operators of the decoded key kψi are all positive 
(addition: +) (see Fig. 3). The operators of the encoded key kψi 
and the decoded key kψi affect the quality of contents in the 
system. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. An example of DCFF algorithm. 
First, various parameters such as the side information, 
entropy code, and so on, are extracted from JPEG data. 
Suppose that specified DCT table P is selected. An example of 
implementation method is shown in Fig. 3(a). The zigzag scan 
result of this DCT table is {10,5,0,0,7,3,2,8,0,0,0,0,1,9}. To 
encode the DCT table, T generates an encoded key kξC. In 
example Fig. 3(a), kξC =3. After that, the last non-zero 
coefficient “9” is encoded by replacing with the difference 
“+6”, which is obtained after applying the calculation as “9-3”. 
Excepting the last non-zero coefficient, the non-zero 
coefficients of {10,5,0,0,7,3,2,8,0,0,0,0,1} are encrypted with 
the previous difference to obtain the scrambled content C. If 
the difference of non-zero coefficient and the previous 
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difference is zero, it is replaced by the closed non-zero 
coefficient. The scrambled of this example is {-2,12,0,0,-7,14,-
11,13,0,0,0,0,-5,6}. This scrambled method is repeated for all 
DCT tables. The scrambled content C is distributed via 
network to users for trial. 
D. Fingerprinted content 
Owing to the fingerprinted key kψi that is created by user's 
information, the fingerprinted information is embedded into the 
decoded content and it is used for tracing the illegal source 
when fingerprinted content is redistributed via network. 
In this decoding process, all encoded non-zero coefficients 
are not completely decoded. However, the scrambled content C 
is decoded to close quality of the original content. In the 
example Fig. 3(b), C is decoded by user Ri depending on the 
decoded key kξi. Note that, the last non-zero coefficient will be 
the position that is embedded the fingerprinted information. 
Assuming that Ri received the key k
ξ
i = 2, which is delivered 
from T. Next, kξi is applied to decode the last non-zero 
coefficient “6” in the zigzag scan results and the decoded 
coefficient “8” is acquired (see Fig. 3(b)). Finally, the 
remaining of non-zero coefficients are decoded with replacing 
by the addition or subtraction between the non-coefficient and 
previous difference. As described in Fig. 3(c), the decoded 
DCT table is {10,5,0,0,7,3,2,8,0,0,0,0,1,8}. 
 
Fig. 4. Examples of experimental images. 
The last coefficient 8 in the zigzag scan of Fig. 3(c) is the 
coefficient in which the userID is embedded.  
After obtaining P’i, P’i is not only decoded with slight 
deterioration, but also fingerprinted with particular information 
(i.e. user information). Therefore, if producer T extracts the 
hash value H'i (the length of H'i is 128 bits) from P'i to exactly 
identify users. 
E. Experimental results 
In the simulated results, firstly, we generated the sets of key 
{kξC=3, k
ψ
C =all (-)}, {k
ξ
i=2, k
ψ
i =all (+)} to encode and decode 
the original content and the scrambled content. We calculated 
the PSNR value of the output JPEG images in every processes 
and extracted the fingerprinting information as hash value (128 
bits) from the incomplete decoded JPEG images to identify 
individual legal user. The experimental results are shown in 
Table II. We see that the fingerprinted JPEG images are not 
distinguishable from the original JPEG images. The scrambled 
JPEG images were degraded about 20dB, and they seemed 
appropriate as trial content. 
In addition, Fig. 4 shows some experimental images. 
According to the results in Fig. 4, it is possible to create the 
scrambled content (see Fig. 4 (a-2), (b-2), (c-2), (d-2)) and 
incomplete decode content (see  Fig. 4 (a-3), (b-3), (c-3), (d-3)) 
based on the incomplete cryptography using DCFF. 
TABLE II.  PSNR[DB] AND HASH BITS. 
 
According to the experimental results, we have established 
the incomplete cryptography system based on the proposed 
method. The scrambled content is created to disclose the 
original content and distributed widely to users. In the 
incomplete decoding process, we changed the some quantized 
DCT coefficient itself instead of the closed quantized DCT 
coefficient by an individual decryption key using DCFF. Thus, 
the original content is not decoded temporarily inside the 
system. We can conclude that the above technical problem by 
the conventional DRM system is solved by using the 
incomplete cryptography system. 
F. Discussion 
In this study, we do not focus on the robustness of 
fingerprinting method. We concentrate to solve the problem of 
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conventional DRM system which is to completely disclose the 
original content inside user's system while decoding process. 
We combine two processes (decoding and fingerprinting) at 
user side to become the incomplete decoding and the user's 
information is fingerprinted into decoded content 
simultaneously. Assuming that there are not any attacks on the 
fingerprinted content, we always identify exactly the legal user 
by extracting 128 bits hash value H’i from the fingerprinted 
content. From this idea, we make the following contributions in 
this paper: 
(1) We proposed the fundamental incomplete cryptography 
which differs from complete cryptography (e.g. DES, AES, ...). 
It is promising to be able to solve the problem of conventional 
DRM system. 
(2) We presented a new DRM system that includes trial 
contents for advertisement and user ID for distinguishing the 
legal user. Our system makes it easier for users to try the digital 
content before deciding whether to buy it or not. 
(3) Our proposed method can detect the source of pirated 
content by comparing the extracted hash value from incomplete 
decoded content with producer's database. It is considered that 
it can limit the illegal redistribution in advance.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a scheme of an incomplete 
cryptography system using DCFF method. This approach 
integrates the encoding process and fingerprinting progress of 
DRM technology. By doing so, we can eliminate the problem 
of the present DRM technology and manage the legal user 
effectively with fingerprinted information individually. 
As previously presented in the experiments, it is obvious 
the above technical problem by the conventional DRM system 
is solved by using the incomplete cryptography system and 
proposed method can maintain a good performance in 
transparency and high quality of decoded content.  
The development of the robust incomplete cryptography is 
our future work. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This work was supported by A.N.Lab JSC. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] G. H. Kim, D. K. Shin, D. G. Shin, “An Efficient Methodology for 
Multimedia Digital Rights Management on Mobile Handset,” IEEE 
Trans. on Consumer Electronics, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 1130--1134, 2004. 
[2] Q. Liu, R. Safavi-Naini, N. P. Sheppard, “Digital Rights Management 
for Content Distribution,” Proc. of AISW2003, Vol. 21, pp. 49-58, 2003. 
[3] DRM technology, “Advanced Image Seminar 2003,” The Institute of 
Image Electronics Engineers of Japan, 2003. 
[4] V. Wahadaniah, Y. L. Guan, H. C. Chua, “A New Collusion Attack and 
Its Performance Evaluation,” Proc. of IWDW, pp. 88-103, 2002. 
[5] D. Kirovski, H. S. Malvar, Y. Yacobi, “Multimedia Content Screening 
Using a Dual Watermarking and Fingerprinting System,” ACM 
Multimedia, 2002. 
[6] W. Trappe, M. Wu, K. J. R. Liu, “Collusion-Resistant Fingerprinting for 
Multimedia,” Proc. Of IEEE Int. Conf. on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal 
Processing (ICAPSSP'02), Vol. 4, pp. 3309--3312, 2002. 
[7] D. Kundur, K. Karthik, “Video fingerprinting and encryption principles 
for digital rights management,” Proc. IEEE vol. 92, no. 6, pp.918--932, 
2004. 
[8] B.M. Macq, J.J. Quisquater, “Cryptology for digital TV broadcasting,” 
Proc. IEEE vol.83, no. 6, pp.944--957, 1995. 
[9] F. Hartung, B. Girod, “Digital watermarking of MPEG-2 coded video in 
the bitstream domain,” Proc. of the IEEE International Conference on 
Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, vol. 4, pp. 2621--2624, 1997. 
[10] J. Bloom, “Security and rights management in digital cinema,” Proc. of 
the IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal 
Processing, vol. 4, pp. 712--715, 2003. 
[11] M. Iwakiri, Ta Minh Thanh, “Fundamental Incomplete Cryptography 
Method to Digital Rights Management Based on JPEG Lossy 
Compression,” The 26th IEEE International Conf. on Advanced 
Information Networking and Applications (AINA-2012), 2012. 
[12] M. Iwakiri, Ta Minh Thanh, “Incomplete Cryptography Method Using 
Invariant Huffman Code Length to Digital Rights Management,” The 
26th IEEE International Conf. on Advanced Information Networking 
and Applications (AINA-2012), 2012. 
[13] J. W. Bos, O. Ozen, and M. Stam, “Efficient hashing using the AES 
instruction set,” In Proc. of the 13th CHES'11, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 
Heidelberg, pp.507--522. 
[14] K.Matsui, “Fundamentals of Digital Watermarking,” Morikita-
publisher,1998.(in Japanese) 
[15] The International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee 
Information Technology - Digital Compression and Coding of 
Continuous-tone still Images - Requirements and Guidelines, 
International Telecommunication Union, 1992. 
 
